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Abstract
The effect of ethnic violence on electoral results provides useful insights into
voter behaviour and the incentives for political parties in democratic societies. Re-
ligious riots have claimed more than 14,000 lives in India since 1950. We study
the effect of Hindu-Muslim riots on election results in India. We combine data
on riots with electoral data on state legislature elections and control variables on
demographics and public goods provision to construct a unique panel data set for
16 large states in India over a 25 year period commencing in 1977. We use a
new instrument that draws upon the random variation in the day of the week that
important Hindu festivals fall on in each year to isolate the causal effect of riots
on electoral results. We find that riots occurring in the year preceding an election
increase the vote share of the Bharatiya Janata Party in the election. We find sug-
gestive evidence that communal polarisation is the likely mechanism driving our
results.
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1 Introduction
‘How do voters choose to cast their vote?’ - this question fascinates economists and has
many answers, each of which explain part of the complexity of real voting decisions.
Voting behaviour has been studied theoretically and empirically in great depth (see An-
solabehere, 2008 for an overview).The rational choice models have voters comparing
their expected utilities under different candidates or parties and choosing their vote to
maximise their expected utilities (Downs, 1957). The most basic interpretation of this
model would have only differences in economic policies and expected economic out-
comes between candidates as factors influencing voting behaviour. These would include
allocation of public goods and public services, macroeconomic policies and plausibly
administrative policies influencing bureaucratic efficiency and corruption. There is an
extensive theoretical and empirical literature establishing that these factors do affect
voter choice and electoral outcomes (Kramer, 1971; Stigler, 1973; Fair, 1996).
Broadening this model of voter behaviour, we can include identity in the individual
voter’s preferences, thus making the ethnic, religious or racial identity of the candidate
or the party an important factor in elections (Glaeser, 2005; Fearon, 1999). Empirically,
there are studies analysing the influence of ethnic divisions on politics in sub-Saharan
Africa (Eifert et al, 2010; Posner, 2004) and others examining the effect of incum-
bents from multiethnic parties on riots in India (Nellis, Weaver and Rosenzweig, 2015).
Within this broader literature on identity and politics, our contribution is to assess the
impact of ethno-religious riots on the results of democratic elections. Investigating
this question provides insights into the direction and magnitude of the effect of ethno-
religious polarisation, or increased salience of ethno-religious identity, on voters’ deci-
sions. Our work is in keeping with a broader literature that uses economic and statistical
methods to evaluate the role of religion in society (see Iyer, 2016 for an overview).
Identity politics and political parties based on ethnic identity are widespread across
the world. The literature from political economics lists two main reasons for electoral
politics being conducted along ethnic lines. One is that different ethnicities may have
different preferences over public goods and hence, political parties evolve around eth-
nic identities to reflect these preferences. The other reason is that it is easier to form
coalitions within an ethnicity to acquire and distribute political rents. Neither of these
reasons explain why ethnic violence should lead to increased support for an ethnic party.
That could be because the violence makes salient that particular identity and results in
polarisation of voters along those lines. This salience-based explanation may be an-
other factor, other than the ones mentioned earlier, behind the existence and success of
identity politics across the world.
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We investigate the effect of Hindu-Muslim riots on state government elections in 16
Indian states from 1977 to 2001. The riots data is obtained from a data set constructed
first by Varshney and Wilkinson (2004) and extended by us, using individual news
reports on Hindu-Muslim riots from The Times of India (Mumbai) newspaper. This
event-study data is supplemented with electoral data from publicly available data on
state assembly elections. The delimitation document (Election Commission, 1976) is
used to map electoral constituencies onto administrative districts. The riots and electoral
data combined with data on demographics and public goods provision from decennial
Indian Censuses are used to construct our unique dataset.
We examine the effect of riots occurring in a district in the year preceding an election
on the vote share obtained by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the
election. We find that the effect is positive and significant and remains robust to using
different control variables and using fixed effects specifications to account for district-
specific unobservables. We establish the causal effect of riots on electoral results by
using a unique instrument for riots. Our instrument is a binary variable that takes the
value 1 when an important Hindu festival in a state in a given year falls on a Friday,
which is the holy day for Muslims. Anecdotal evidence suggests that religious riots
are exacerbated by festivals which are salient for particular religious groups, mainly
because these festivals are often associated with very visible public displays of religious
faith such as religious processions and collective worship. We hypothesize that such
occurrences, whose dates are based completely on lunar cycles, increase the probability
of riots occurring and find that the data supports this hypothesis. Using this variable to
instrument for riots we find a positive and significant causal effect of riots on the vote
share of the BJP.
We also analyse the impact of possible under-reporting of riots on both our OLS
and IV estimates and show that while the bias in the OLS estimate will be negative
and bounded, the bias in the IV estimate will be positive and unbounded. We obtain a
crude measure of under-reporting by comparing our dataset to other sources and use the
derived expressions for the biases to correct our estimates. We find that a riot in the year
preceding an election can lead to an increase in the BJP’s vote share by 6 - 8 percentage
points, which is the upper bound for our estimate. We also find that riots effect election
outcomes in adjoining districts and the effect decays with distance.
Hindu-Muslim riots in India have been the subject of a number of studies, most of
which have examined what causes the riots. These causes are social (Brass, 1997, 2003;
Varshney, 2002), economic (Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010; Mitra and Ray, 2014, Field
et al, 2008) and political (Wilkinson, 2004; Jha, 2014; Pathania and Tandon, 2011;
Blakeslee, 2013). There are very few studies in the economics of India which examine
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the political implications of the occurrence of riots.
While both Blakeslee (2013) and Varshney and Gubler (2012) do discuss incentives,
of a political party in the first case and of the state in the second, to incite ethnic tensions
to obtain better electoral results, they do not demonstrate the effect explicitly. The main
reason for the lack of studies demonstrating this effect is because of the methodological
challenge of establishing exogenous causes for the riots. The major contribution of our
paper is that it overcomes this challenge by using a unique religious festival instrument
which also demonstrates the magnitude and direction of the effect of riots on electoral
results. The most important implication of our work is that it provides a solid basis
for the argument that the majority identity party has a clear incentive to incite ethnic
tensions or even to cause riots. Recent events in India have shown that this was used as
a strategy in Western Uttar Pradesh (Muralidharan 2014; Rao et al 2014).
Section 2 provides a brief historical background of inter-communal relations and
electoral politics in India and reviews the literature on identity politics and ethnic vio-
lence, both in India and more widely. Section 3 contains a description of the data used.
Section 4 explains the econometric specification and describes the instrument used to
identify the causal effect of religious riots on election results. Section 5 describes the
regressions and their results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Religious Riots and Indian Electoral Politics3
The history of religious riots and politics in India can be divided into 4 phases: pre-
Independence, between 1947-1977, between 1977-2001, and from 2001 to the present.
In India, there is evidence of religion-related incidents of violence as early as the
eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, there were communal riots in Ahmedabad
in 1714; in Kashmir in 1719-20, in Delhi in 1729 and in Vidarbha in 1786. For the
nineteenth century, historians report evidence of incidents in Benaras (1809-15), Koil
(1820), Moradabad and Kashipur (1833), Bareilly, Kanpur and Allahabad (1837-52)
(Bayly 1983). However, communal incidents were not a regular aspect of provincial
life in the nineteenth century (Indian Statutory Commission Report, 1930: 97-107).
Riots were localised in East Bengal (1907), Peshawar (1910), Ayodhya (1912), Agra
(1913), Shahabad (1917) and Katarpur (1918). Between 1920 and 1924 there were
riots in Malegaon, Multan, Lahore, Saharanpur, Amritsar, Allahabad, Calcutta, Delhi,
Gulbarga, Kohat, Lucknow and Nagpur. In southern and western India, there were no
significant riots until 1928 when they affected Bangalore, Nasik, Surat and Hyderabad.
3Our account here of the political history of post-Independent India draws heavily on the work of
Guha (2007). The history of religious riots is drawn from Iyer (2002).
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There were major riots in Calcutta and Bombay in 1926 and 1928 (see Iyer, 2002 for a
more detailed discussion).
As the movement against colonial rule led by the Indian National Congress gathered
momentum, domestic politics began to be more communalised. The Muslim League
which claimed to represent the Muslims of the country, expressed mistrust in the secular
rhetoric of the Congress, claiming that it represented the interests of Hindus only. The
Civil Disobedience movement of 1942 yielded fresh outbursts of communal violence,
which have been attributed by some historians to imperial forces that tried to control
the struggle for independence (Sarkar, 1981). With the end of British rule imminent,
the Muslim League’s demand for the partition of India along religious lines became the
flash point. Serious communal clashes took place, at times repeatedly, in Ahmedabad,
Calcutta, Noakhali, Bhagalpur, Dacca, Patna, Bombay and Allahabad in 1946-47. The
riots leading up to and continuing through the eventual partition of India and the creation
of Pakistan remain the most devastating episode of communal violence in modern India
with estimates of the death toll ranging from 200,000 to 1 million people (Pandey,
2001).
After gaining independence in 1947, India formally became a democratic repub-
lic and adopted a written constitution in 1950, with the first general elections being
held in 1951. Although the Indian National Congress (INC), the party credited with
fighting for independence and then establishing a functioning democracy in India, had
had uninterrupted control of the central government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru, its control was by no means unchallenged. Among the many parties opposing
the Congress was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), a Hindu nationalist party formed in
1951 by Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, who resigned from Nehru’s cabinet, in consulta-
tion with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist social organi-
sation. Although there were other smaller Hindu nationalist parties such as the Hindu
Mahasabha and the Rama Rajya Parishad, the BJS was the main representative of the
Hindu nationalist view. Its vote share grew from 3% in the first national elections in
1951 to 14% in the fifth national elections in 1971.
Post-independent India from 1947 to 1949 is not part of our dataset although riots
in the aftermath of partition continued during this period. In fact 1950, the first year
in our dataset, has the highest number of reported riots, 50, till the 1980s. The period
from 1950-1976 was relatively calmer with an average of about 15.4 riots reported per
year. The period that we are concerned with in this paper, 1977-2001, witnessed a much
higher rate of incidents of about 42.7 riots reported per year from across the country.
The political events that accompanied this increase in violence are described below.
The 1970s saw division in the ranks of the INC and the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
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adopting increasingly populist rhetoric to counter it. Democracy was suspended by
Indira Gandhi with the imposition of Emergency in 1975. Leaders of opposition parties
including BJS were arrested and the press was censored. The Emergency was lifted in
1977 and elections were conducted at the centre as well as in several states. The Janata
Party, an agglomeration of parties ranging from the left-leaning Socialist Party to the
Hindu nationalist BJS, came to power to form the first non-Congress government at the
centre since independence. The government was short lived and collapsed in 1980. The
next round of elections saw the resurgence of the INC under Indira Gandhi at the centre
as well as in several states. The leaders of the erstwhile BJS left the Janata party to
regroup and formed the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980.
The INC retained control of the centre first under Indira and later under her son
Rajiv Gandhi, till 1989. The assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in
1984 was followed by a spate of anti-Sikh riots. During this time, the BJP along with
other subsidiary associations of the RSS started a movement to build a temple at the site
of the disputed Babri Mosque or Babri Masjid in Ayodhya. The movement helped the
BJP gain popular support and it came to power in several states. In the general election
of 1989 the BJP gathered 11% of the votes and was the third largest party in parliament
after the INC and the Janata Dal, a centrist remnant of the erstwhile Janata Party. It
supported a government of the National Front, a coalition of the Janata Dal with some
regional parties, under Prime Minister V.P. Singh. This government also did not last
long, with the BJP withdrawing support primarily because of V.P.Singh’s efforts to stop
the Babri Masjid agitation being supported by the BJP. In the subsequent elections in
1991, the BJP gathered 20% of the votes and established itself as the main opposition
party to the INC government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao. In December 1992, the Babri
Masjid movement led by the BJP culminated in the demolition of the disputed structure
by militant Hindu nationalists. A spate of riots erupted in different parts of the country
including Mumbai and Surat.
These riots were followed by a period of comparative calm till 2001. During this
time a BJP led government came to power for the first time in 1996, albeit only for a
period of 13 days. Eventually the BJP led National Democratic Alliance ruled at the
centre from 1998 to 2004. In 2002, a series of riots erupted in the state of Gujarat, where
BJP leaders were allegedly directly involved. These riots left at least a thousand people
dead and forced approximately 98,000 people into refugee camps (Jha 2014). This
was followed by a period of relative calm until 2013, where riots have again broken
out in Kishtwar in Jammu and in Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh. The involvement of
political leaders in both these riots has been the subject of many articles (Muralidharan
2014; Rao et al 2014) and the results of the general elections overwhelmingly and in an
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unprecedented manner favoured the BJP in both these regions. The question of whether
this substantial swing towards the BJP was because of the riots or was part of a nation-
wide swing that led to the party’s victory in the elections, is difficult to answer. This
paper answers exactly the same question, but for previous state elections during 1977-
2001 and finds that riots did indeed contribute substantially to increasing the BJP’s vote
share in that period.
2.1 Riots and politics
Fearon (2008) provides an excellent overview of the literature examining the causes
and the relationship between ethnic politics and ethnic violence. He concludes that the
relationship between the two has not been adequately addressed. Ethnoreligious con-
flicts themselves have been widely researched. Arguably starting with Horowitz (1985),
the study of the causes of ethnic conflict has generated a substantial literature. Esteban
and Ray (2008) describe how economic polarisation along ethnic lines can lead to ethnic
conflict. DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998) focus on the 1960’s urban race riots in the USA
and find that the individual costs and benefits of rioting, in terms of the probability and
size of punishment, unemployment and ownership of property, matter. Hindu-Muslim
riots in India have also been well documented: for example, Varshney (2002) describes
the role of civic institutions in preventing inter-ethnic violence. Bohlken and Sergenti
(2010) find that low economic growth increases the probability of riots occurring, while
Mitra and Ray (2014) find that growth in Muslim per-capita expenditures increases the
chances of future communal violence while the increase in Hindu per-capita expendi-
tures has negative or no effect. Field et al (2008) find that rent control restricted the
locational choices of workers thus preventing segregation and hence leading to riots in
Gujarat. These examples show that the causes of riots are complex and multi-faceted.
The findings on economic and social causes of riots does not preclude the presence of
other factors such as electoral politics. The fact that communal riots were happening in
India before electoral politics existed in the country implies that this cannot be the sole
cause.
The relationship between electoral politics and Hindu-Muslim riots in India has
been explored in a few studies. Wilkinson (2004) shows that riots are less likely in
states with higher effective number of political parties and where the ruling party de-
pends on minority votes. At the local level, using data from 167 towns in the state of
Uttar Pradesh, he finds that higher electoral competition measured as the closeness of
state elections in towns leads to the higher likelihood of riots. Varshney and Gubler
(2012) present criticisms of both results. They imply that the role of the state govern-
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ments might have been overstated with respect to the first result and they raise certain
methodological objections about the mapping of electoral constituencies onto towns for
the second one. Wilkinson’s second result finds support from Jha (2014), whose study
focussed on the state of Gujarat finding that close elections do indeed predict a higher
likelihood of riots at the level of towns. Jha (2014) also finds significant effects of
historical inter-ethnic relationships on the duration of riots.
Apart from electoral competition, another strand of the literature focusses on the
relationship between the electoral results of the majority identity party, in this case the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the incidence of riots. Pathania and Tandon (2011)
investigate the relationship between the BJP’s results in the 1989 and 1991 national
elections and the incidence of riots. They find that the share of close elections won by
the BJP is positively correlated with the severity of subsequent riots, as measured by
the number of people killed or injured or as the duration of the riot. They do not find
any correlation between the results of the BJP and the frequency of riots. They do find
a correlation between riots and the number of close elections, similar to the electoral
competition literature discussed above. Nellis, Weaver and Rosenzweig (2015) find
that a victory of the Indian National Congress in close elections for the state assembly
between 1962 and 2000 led to a reduction in Hindu-Muslim riots. Blakeslee (2013)
shows that the BJP’s campaign involving its leaders touring northern India as part of
the Babri Masjid agitation led to an increase in the party’s vote share in the subsequent
national elections in 1991, as well as an increase in the probability of riots.
Although many scholars refer to the relationship between riots and politics, more so
in the case of India, there have been few studies of the effect of ethnic violence on elec-
toral politics. Blattman (2009) finds that in northern Uganda, violence led to increased
political participation in the form of increased voting and community leadership. Aidt
and Franck (2015) show that the so-called Swing riots in England in 1830-31 increased
the votes polled by pro-electoral reform politicians. In India, although the causes of
riots and the role political competition may play in them have been studied in great
detail, there is no evidence regarding the impact of the riots themselves on electoral re-
sults. The assessment of this impact is essential to understand the incentives that ethnic
identity-based political parties have in planning their electoral strategy.
The theoretical background for expecting ethnic riots to have a bearing on politics
was provided as early as Coser (1956) who argued that inter-group conflict serves to in-
crease within group cohesion. To extend the argument, increased within group cohesion
would benefit a political party that seeks votes on the basis of group identity.
In the Indian context, Jha (2014) finds a positive correlation between the duration of
riots and an increase in BJP’s vote share but makes no attempt to establish a causal rela-
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tionship. The main focus of the paper is the effect of historical inter-ethnic relationship
on present day inter-ethnic dynamics reflected in riots and elections . Brass (2003) in
his detailed study of riots and politics in Aligarh in Uttar Pradesh describes the complex
relationship between politics and ethnic relations. He writes,
“The gist of my argument on the relationship between party politics and ri-
ots were stated in one of my earlier works as follows: “there is a continuum
from political rivalry leading to communal riots to political rivalry feeding
on communal riots.” The continuum may, however start at either end, that
is, from political rivalry to riots as well as from communal riots to intensi-
fied political rivalry. However, the sequence in Aligarh has been primarily
in the latter direction, that is, communal riots have preceded and have led to
intensification of interparty competition. The mechanisms that lead to this
intensification arise from the tendencies that follow from riots to foster in-
creased communal solidarity and polarization, which in turn are promoted
by political parties and/or individual candidates who stand to benefit from
such solidarity and polarization. The resultant communalization and polar-
ization in turn reduce the electoral prospects of parties and candidates who
stand for secular political practices, intercommunal cooperation, and class
or caste/baradari mobilization rather than communal mobilization.”
It is this change in “electoral prospects” that we attempt to elucidate more clearly in this
paper.
3 Data
India has a quasi-federal system of government where power is shared between the cen-
tral government and the state governments. The control over law and order, and hence
the handling of riots, is within the state government’s ambit. As of 2001, India consisted
of 25 states. For this analysis we only look at large states with population greater than
10 million as at the 2001 census. There are sixteen such states that account for 96% of
India’s population. These states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka,
Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh
and West Bengal. This includes three states – Jharkhand, Chattisgarh and Uttarakhand
- that were created in 2000. We collected data for 25 years from 1977 to 2001 because
this was the period during which the delimitation done in 1977 is valid. Data for all
variables is consolidated at the level of the district. These are administrative divisions
and most public data is available at this level. Over time the districts have been divided
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and merged to create new ones. We use the district as defined in 1977 and match the
rest of the data to that. This gives us a panel dataset of 338 districts over 25 years.
3.1 Elections
Electoral data for state elections was collected from statistical reports released by the
Election Commission. We have used data from state elections rather than from national
elections as there were only eight national elections during the 25 year period and it
would be difficult to disassociate the effects of the elections with that of random events
happening coterminously. If we consider state elections then there were elections in at
least one of the sixteen states in 21 of the 25 years in consideration.
India has a five-year electoral cycle. So, we have at least five elections for every
state except Jammu and Kashmir, which has four, in this twenty-five year period. Some
states have more (up to seven) elections because sometimes early elections are called
due to various reasons (no party getting a clear majority or the state government being
dismissed by the central government). Only state-wide election results were considered
– by-election results were ignored. Each state has a number of electoral constituencies,
ranging from 87 for Jammu and Kashmir to 425 for Uttar Pradesh that elect represen-
tatives for the state legislative assemblies. These electoral constituencies are grouped
into administrative districts each containing on average eleven constituencies. We use
the district instead of the electoral constituency as our geographical unit as all the other
data is available at district level. It is still a reasonably small unit since we have 338
districts in the 16 states we are considering. We aggregate the election data that is avail-
able at the constituency level to the district level using the official delimitation order
(Election Commission, 1976). We construct the vote share of a party as a fraction with
the numerator being the total votes polled by the party in the district and the denomi-
nator being the total number of valid votes cast in all those constituencies in the district
in which the party fielded a candidate. The main dependent variable we use is the vote
share of the BJP in a district in an election.
We also construct a control variable BJP government, which is a binary variable that
has a value of 1 when the BJP is part of the state government for a given district in a
given year. This is important because which party controls the state government may
play an important role in influencing both electoral results and the occurrence of riots.
3.2 Riots
Our main explanatory variable is the occurrence of riots. Data for the riots that oc-
curred between 1977 and 2001 in these 16 states was extracted from a larger dataset
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that extends from 1950-2006. The initial dataset from 1950-1995 was constructed by
Varshney-Wilkinson (2004) and it was extended using individual newspaper reports on
riots from the Mumbai edition of The Times of India, held in the India Office archives
of The British Library. Most of the observations included the names of towns, villages,
and in some cases districts. Using this information, each riot happening in one of the
16 states was matched with one of the 338 districts. The data includes the number of
riots that occurred in a year, the duration of the riots and the reported cause of the riot.
In many cases the number of people injured, killed and arrested was also reported.
Since each observation is a newspaper report of a riot, the actual intensity of the riot
that is being reported varies. As shown in Table 1, there are riots that go on for many
days. In other cases, reports of riots from the same place are reported over several days
and are hence coded as separate riots in our data. So, it is acknowledged that there is
some ambiguity over the intensity of violence that each reported incident represents.
For this reason we choose to focus on the extensive rather than on the intensive margin.
We construct the primary variable of concern as a binary variable indicating if at least
one riot occurred in a given district in a given year. Of a total of 8450 district-year
observations, 555 had at least one riot, so the unconditional probability of having at
least one riot in a year in a district is 7%.
The reported causes of the riots range from fights between individuals to clashes
over religious processions. These represent proximate causes that may or may not result
in a full-fledged riot depending on the prevailing atmosphere of communal tension.
Varshney and Gubler (2013) use the metaphor of ’sparks and fires’, where ’sparks’ of
small clashes happen everywhere but in an atmosphere of general communal harmony
these sparks get doused, whereas in a communally polarised area they may result in a
’fire’ or riot.
We also geo-coded the location of each riot. Mapping this on to the location of
each district allowed us not only to assign the district in which the riot occured but also
measure the distance of any other district to the location of the riot.
Table 1 below provides further details of our riots data. More than 70% district-
years that had riots had only one riot in that year. Most of the district-years that had
riots had them for only 1 day, but the number of observations of more than 5 days is
also significant.
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Table 1. The reported causes, number and duration of riots in 338 Indian districts between
1977-2001
3.3 Demographics and public goods
Demographics play an important role in electoral results and may also be a factor in the
occurrence of riots. Hence, we use religious demographic composition, urbanisation
and literacy as control variables. The district-wise distribution of the Muslim popula-
tion across the country was obtained from four Censuses from 1971 to 2001. A number
of changes in the organisation of districts have occurred between 1971 and 2001. A
number of new districts were created and old districts were re-named. We conducted a
mapping of the districts in each Census year compared to those in 1971. The Muslim
population of the district in non-Census years was obtained by linearly interpolating
between two consecutive Censuses. Hence we obtain an approximate value of the Mus-
lim population in each year in each district. The Muslim population share ranged from
almost 0 to more than 98%. However, the distribution is highly skewed with the me-
dian at 8.55% and with three-fourths of the districts having less than 14% of Muslims.
Similarly, data on urbanisation and literacy levels of the districts was collected from the
Censuses.
The provision of public goods may be a factor influencing the choice of voters. Its
effect on riots is not self-evident but there is some literature linking economic factors to
ethnic violence (Bohlken and Sergenti, 2010; Mitra and Ray, 2014) and we use public
goods provision to control for these effects. We again use Census data to obtain the
percentage of households that have access to tap water and the percentage of households
that have access to electricity. As before, we interpolate linearly between Census years
to obtain values for other years.
4 Econometric specification and identification strategy
We estimate the effect of riots on electoral results using this panel dataset. Our specifi-
cation is as follows. The subscripts have their usual meanings.
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BJP vote shareit =α+β Riotit−1+γ1BJP governmentit−1+γ2Demographic controlsit+
γ3Public goods provisionit + γ4Time trendst +δi+ εit
Here δi represents district fixed effects. Our main explanatory variable is Riotit−1,
which indicates the occurence of at least one riot in the district in the year before the
elections. Here we use the calendar year rather than a twelve month period preceding
the election. This is because the year of election is largely pre-decided as it follows
the electoral cycle, but the month of election is fixed by the election commission taking
many factors into account, and riots could be one of them. We do use the preceding
tweleve month period in one of the robustness checks and find that the results are un-
changed.
While estimating this specification would give us the correlation between riots and
BJP vote share, but interpreting it as a causal effect would be problematic. It may be the
case that riots may be caused in expectation of a good result by the BJP. Another pos-
sibility could be the presence of time-varying unobservables that affect both electoral
results and the likelihood of riots.
In order to establish the causal effect of riots on electoral results we construct an
instrument for riots. Anecdotal evidence from the newspaper reports that is used to
construct the riots data show that a number of riots tend to occur when religious proces-
sions are taken out on days of religious significance. These processions are both visible
and vocal. For Muslims, Fridays are important religiously as special weekly prayers
are held in mosques on those days. These generally result in a large congregation of
people in the area surrounding the mosque. The Hindus have a number of festivals of
differing importance depending on the state and region. The day on which these festi-
vals fall depends on the Hindu lunar calendar. Hence, we contend that a year when, in
a given region, an important Hindu festival also falls on a Friday, the chances of a riot
happening is higher. Moreover, these riots may happen on the festival day itself or may
be the result of communal tensions created on the festival day or in anticipation of it.
Hence, in keeping with our logic, we construct an instrument, Festival, as follows: First
we select the five most important Hindu festivals for each state. In this we are guided by
the public holidays declared and published officially in each state by the state govern-
ment. Hence, major festivals such as Dussehra and Diwali that are celebrated across the
country were used for all states but festivals such as Holi or Ganesh Chaturthi, which
are more local, were used for the respective states in which they are predominantly cel-
ebrated (for example in this case in Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra respectively). The
festivals chosen for each state is given in Appendix 1. For districts in each state, the in-
strument was set equal to one for the year in which one of these festivals fell on a Friday,
and it was set equal to zero for all other years. Hence, we construct a completely ex-
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ogenous instrument with variation in both cross-sectional and time dimensions. As we
use this instrument in fixed effects regressions, any state-specific endogeneity inherent
in the historical importance of a festival in a given state, is eliminated.
A list of variables with summary statistics is provided in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Description of the main variables
The number of observations of the dependent variable, BJP vote share, is only 1571
because we include only election years, and hence this results in a very unbalanced
panel data set. The observations for some of the control variables is also lower than the
maximum of 8450 because of some missing data in the Censuses.
14
5 Results
5.1 Basic specification
Table 3 presents the results of regressions of Riotit−1 on BJP voteshareit using different
specifications and control variables. The first column is an OLS regression where we
control for having a BJP government in the year before the election and use state fixed
effects. We find that the effect of riots in the previous year on the vote share of the BJP
is positive and statistically significant.
As we have panel data we can use fixed effects regression to account for district spe-
cific time invariant heterogeneity, which could be biasing the OLS results. Columns 2-6
present the results of district level fixed effects regressions. The standard errors are clus-
tered at the district level to account for the possibility of correlation in the error terms
of observations from the same district. In the third column we introduce a quadratic
time trend to account for country level variation in the popularity of the BJP. We are
not able to use year fixed effects because we have an unbalanced panel and many years
with very few observations, hence we lose power on account of using year dummies
and lose significance in other estimates as well. In the robustness checks subsection
we show some regressions with five year fixed effects and the coefficients are similar
to the ones shown here. Returning to Table 3, in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns
we add controls for demographic variables, namely the percentage of Muslims in the
population, urbanisation and literacy; and variables that capture public goods provision,
namely the availability of electricity and tap water.
We find that the coefficient of Riotit−1 is consistently positive and significant across
all specifications and is robust to the addition of various control variables. The magni-
tude of approximately 0.03 indicates that a riot is correlated with an increase in the vote
share of the BJP by approximately 3 percentage points. The magnitude is significant
for close elections but does not suggest that riots are correlated with large swings in the
electoral results. The control variables for literacy and those for public goods are also
significantly correlated with the dependent variable, but it is difficult to interpret these
correlations in the absence of exogenous variation in these variables.
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Table 3. Regression on BJP voteshareit of Riotit−1and other variables
5.2 Addressing endogeneity
We have shown that a significant positive correlation exists between the BJP’s vote
share and riots occurring in the year before elections. To interpret this as a causal effect
of riots on vote share, we need to consider a few confounding factors. The first possi-
bility is reverse causation. It may be the case that riots may be caused in expectation of
a good result by the BJP. Another possibility could be the presence of time-varying dis-
trict specific unobservables that affect both electoral results and the likelihood of riots.
To deal with these problems, we use an instrument variable to isolate the exogenous
variation in riots.
The instrument we use, as described earlier, is a dummy variable that takes a value 1
whenever an important Hindu festival in a district in a given year falls on a Friday, which
is a holy day for Muslims. We hypothesize that such occurrences will lead to increased
communal tensions and increased probability of riots. The first stage regression shown
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in Table 4, supports this hypothesis. The coefficient of the instrument Festivalit−1 is
positive and highly significant and with an F-statistic much above the cut-off norm of
10. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates that when an important Hindu festival
falls on a Friday, this increases the probability of riots by 3 percentage points, which is
quite significant as the unconditional probability of a riot occurring is 7%.
Table 4. First stage regression on Riotit−1 of instrument variable Festivalit−1
Hence, this instrument satisfies the first requirement of being relevant, i.e. it is cor-
related with the endogenous variable. The second requirement for the instrument is that
it should be exogenous. The dates of Hindu festivals depend on the Hindu lunar calen-
dar and there cannot be any reason to think that the dates on which Hindu festivals fall
should affect election results other than through riots. Any possible endogeneity intro-
duced by state specific choice of festivals is eliminated in the fixed effects regression.
However, there are two reasons why the exclusion restriction required for the valid-
ity of the instrument may be violated. The first reason is that while we have assumed
that a riot occurring in a district will influence the election results only in that district,
this may not be the case. The area of the electoral effect of the riot may extend beyond
the district in which it occurs. If this is the case then the instrument variable, which is
common for all districts within the same state, can affect election results in a district
not only through riots occuring in that district but through riots occuring in adjoining
districts as well. This would violate the exclusion restriction. The second reason could
be the under reporting of riots. The instrument could affect the election results through
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riots which are not reported in the newspaper, thus leading to a bias in the IV coefficient.
For the remainder of this subsection, we will ignore these two issues and proceed with
using the instrument as if it is valid. In the next subsection, we will formulate ways to
correct for both of these issues and will present our final set of results.
Table 5 shows the results of the reduced form regressions as well as that of the fixed
effects 2-stage least squares regressions using Festivalit−1 as an instrument for Riotit−1.
We find that the coefficient of Riotit−1 is positive and significant. The number of ob-
servations here is substantially reduced compared to the first stage regression shown
above because of the nature of the dependent variable, hence it is essential to check for
weak instrument bias. We use the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic since the standard errors
are not i.i.d. but clustered at the level of districts (Kleibergen and Paap, 2006). The
Stock-Yogo critical value (Stock and Yogo, 2005) for i.i.d. errors at 10% maximal IV
size is 16.38. In comparison to that the F-statistic is higher in all but one case, in which
it is marginally below. Hence, we conclude that weak instrument bias is not significant
in our case.
The IV coefficients shown above should be interpreted as Local Average Treatment
Effects (LATE). The effect here is the average effect of the increase in probability of
riots that occurs because of Hindu festivals falling on Fridays. It may be the case that
the effect of riots on vote share is heterogeneous and is particularly high in those places
where riots do result from the coincidence of a festival falling on a particular day. Even
then, a 30% vote share gain implies that whenever a riot happens in a year where a
Hindu festival falls on a Friday, an election in the next year will almost certainly result
in a BJP victory. This seems unrealistic and could be the result of biases discussed
earlier viz. larger area of effect of riots and under reporting of riots. We deal with these
two issues in the next subsection.
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Table 5. Reduced form and IV regressions using Festvalit−1 as instrument variable for Riotit−1
5.3 Area of effect of riots
The reduced form estimates reported in Table 5 can be crudely interpreted as the differ-
ence in average vote share of the BJP between the election years that did and did not
have a Hindu festival falling on a Friday in the preceding year. As the mean value of
the Festival variable is around 0.55, this coincidence is fairly common. Hence, a little
more than half of the election years would have had this coincidence in the previous
year. But the occurence of a riot in a district is very rare. The exclusion restriction
would imply that the increase in the average of the vote shares in all the election years
that had the festival coincidence is because of that rare incidence of riot that may have
happened in one of those years. As mentioned earlier, this may not be the case. The
election years in which the festival coincidence did not cause a riot in the same district
in the preceding year could have experienced a riot in one of the adjoining districts, and
the increased average vote share could be because of these riots as well. Hence, if we
control for the riots in adjoining districts, we should be able to overcome this violation
of the exclusion restriction.
Since we have the geographical coordinates of the riots, we can construct a control
variable that is 1 for district i in year t, when there is no riot in district i and there is at
least one riot within a radius of x km from the district centre. (The district centre is de-
fined as the location of the largest city in the district. Please refer to the Data Appendix
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for details). Introducing this control in the regression does result in a smaller coefficient
of Riotit−1, but it leads to two problems. One is that the occurence of riots in adjoining
districts is very likely endogenous and since it is correlated with the explanatory vari-
able and the instrument, it would be contaminating the coefficient estimate. The second
problem is that the choice of the radius of effect x is arbitrary and the coefficent esti-
mates are found to be sensitive to the value chosen. This is to be expected as the effect
of riots happening just outside x is assumed to be zero, and any change in the value may
just include or just exclude some riots leading to changes in the coefficient.
To overcome these limitations, we construct a new explanatory variable by making
the assumption that when there is no riot in district i itself, the election results are
influenced by the nearest riot occurring the preceding year and the effect is lower as the
distance of the riot from the district is higher. We define the new variable as φ(dit−1),
where dit−1 is the distance of the riot nearest to district i in year t-1, and φ is a decay
function such that φ(0) = 1 and φ(x)→ 0 as x→ ∞. The specification now is
BJP vote shareit =α+βaφ(dit−1)+γ1BJP governmentit−1+γ2Demographic controlsit+
γ3Public goods provisionit + γ4Time trendst +δi+ εit
The coefficient βa has the same interpretation as the earlier coefficient. It implies
that the vote share of the BJP in state elections in a district will increase by βa if at least
one riot happened in the same district in the previous year. The first stage regression
with the instrument also has a simple interpretation. A Hindu festival falling on a Friday
may lead to a riot in the district or in nearby areas and the probability of it leading to a
riot decreases as the distance from the district increases.
To estimate this specification, we need to specify the function φ . We choose a
Gaussian decay function as it is simple and widely used. The selection of the standard
deviation for the distribution still poses a problem. We tabulate the results for a num-
ber of values for the standard deviation. The average area of a district as of the 1981
Census was around 8000 square kilometres4, which corresponds to a circle with radius
of approximately 50 kms. Hence, we start with a value of 100 kms and increase in
steps of 50 kms. The coefficient is relatively stable and is approximately in the range
of 0.08 to 0.1 for the standard deviation up to the value of 300 kms. The value of 200
kms provides the best fit as measured by the smallness of the root mean squared error,
Akaikie’s information criterion as well as the Bayesian information criterion. Hence
the corresponding estimate of 0.081 is the best estimate for the coefficient βa.
4The surface area of India is 3.288 million square kilometres, which is divided into 412 districts to
obtain the average district size.
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Table 6. Regression results for different standard deviations for φ(.)
5.4 Under-reporting of riots
As we are using newspaper reports of riots, it is likely that not every riot gets reported.
This under-reporting may bias our estimates, as discussed earlier. In order to derive an
expression for this bias, we make three assumption regarding the nature of reporting of
riots.
1. There is no over reporting, i.e. the newspaper never reports a riot that has not
actually happened.
2. Conditional on a district having had one or more actual riots, the probability of at
least one riot from that district getting reported is independent of the instrument
variable, i.e. riots that are caused because of Hindu festivals falling on a Friday
are as likely to be reported as other riots.
3. If a district has had one or more riots in the year before elections, then the effect
of those riots on the election results is independent of whether they are reported
or not.
The third assumption is most likely not true - simply because newspaper reporting of
the riots may increase the effect on elections. But making the assumption leads to over-
estimation of the bias. This implies that the coefficient estimate after correcting for
under reporting would be a lower bound for the coefficient.
Let the actual probability of at least one riot occurring in a district be λ and given
that one or more riots have occurred in the district, the probability of at least one riot
being reported be p. We show in Appendix 2 that for regressions without other covari-
ates, the OLS and IV estimates, βˆOLS and βˆIV respectively, calculated using the reported
riots would be related to the actual OLS and IV estimates, βˆ ∗OLS and βˆ
∗
IV respectively, as
follows.
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βˆOLS =
1−λ
1− pλ βˆ
∗
OLS
βˆIV =
1
p
βˆ ∗IV
The bias on the OLS estimate is negative and bounded by λ , while the bias on the IV
estimate is positive and unbounded. We can calculate the bias by getting an estimate of
the reporting rate p. We use two studies that provide data on all the riots that happened
in a particular place in a given time period. We compare these with the riots reported in
the newspapers that we used to get an estimate of the reporting rate.
Jha (2014) investigates Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat between 27th February and
15th April, 2002. He augments newspaper and online reports with eye witness refugee
testimonials and finds a total of 30 riots in this time period. The Times of India, Mum-
bai edition, that we have used in our dataset, following the methodology adopted by
Varshney-Wilkinson, reports only 23. This leads to a reporting rate p = 0.77. But this
is not strictly comparable to our case as all riots happen in a very short span of time and
this particular year 2002 is also outside of our sample period 1977-2001.
A similar exercise using data from Brass (2003) consisting of riots in the city of
Aligarh from 1977 until 1995 is more informative. Brass provides information on riots
and “riotous periods” using various records including bureaucratic reports and data from
NGOs allowing us to check for reporting rates over a long time span. The resulting
reporting rate is p = 0.83 and is comparable to the one obtained from Jha (2014).
If we use the average value of p = 0.8 and apply the under reporting correction to
the coefficient estimate obtained in the previous section, we get the value of the estimate
as 0.065. As mentioned earlier, this value is a lower bound and the actual coefficient
will be between this and 0.081 to the extent that assumption 3 is violated.
5.4.1 Other concerns with the exclusion restriction
The validity of the instrument can still be questioned if the occurence of Hindu festivals
on Friday affects vote share directly and not only through riots. It can be argued that the
tensions created between Hindus and Muslims due to contestations over public space
during such a coincidence could directly lead the Hindus to vote for the BJP. Such
tensions at the local level may well change the voting behaviour of the small number
of people actually involved in a particular altercation, but will not create any significant
impact in the vote share across a district with a population of around a million people.
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A riot can change voting behaviour through a number of mechanisms, discussed in the
next section, through which people who were not directly involved in the rioting change
their voting behaviour as they are made more aware of the incident or are indirectly
affected by it. An altercation that does not result in any ’incident’ cannot affect other
people in this way. The other argument could be that the festival coincidence leads
to a number of such small unreported altercations across the district that can then lead
cumulatively to a change in voting behaviour. If such a phenomenon was so widespread
then it would be surprising that it has escaped the attention of journalists and academics
who scrutinise Indian elections in great detail. On the other hand, the effect of festivals
on riots and that of riots on elections have been widely reported, as mentioned earlier.
There could be any number of explanations for how the festival coincidence creates
something, as Alfred Marshall (1920) wrote albeit in a different context, “in the air”5
that leads people to change their voting behaviour, but in the absence of a quantifiable
measure of such an effect, it is impossible for us to check or indeed to control for it. We
would argue that even if such an effect is present, it is likely to be small and local and
may not create a significant bias in our estimates.
5.5 Mechanisms
In this section we discuss the different mechanisms through which riots can impact the
voting decisions of electors. Most of the arguments in this section are speculative as it
is difficult to pin down the exact mechanism of individual behaviour using district level
aggregates, but we think it is still important to try and interpret some of the trends and
correlations that we see in the data. There are three ways in which religious riots could
change voting behaviour.
1. Turnout: Riots could leave in their wake an atmosphere of fear and lack of se-
curity in public spaces. This could make some electors choose not to go out and
vote. It can be argued that voters from the minority religion are going to be more
at risk and they are more likely to stay at home for fear of violence. This can
result in an increase in the vote share of the party that represents the majority
religion, which is the BJP in our case. This is one possible explanation for the
results that we have observed in the previous section.
2. Learning: It may be the case that a riot would lead to a change in a person’s
5Alfred Marshall was interested in manufacturing in Victorian Britain, specifically, why firms in the
same industry located geographically close to each other. He argued that proximity created something “in
the air” because “. . . if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions
of their own; and thus it becomes the source of further new ideas.” (Marshall, 1920, p.271).
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ideology and/or party affiliation. It is not very clear if this would lead to more or
fewer people voting for the party representing the majority religion, but this still
can be a feasible explanation for the results that we observe.
3. Polarisation: Religious riots could lead to the religious identity of voters becom-
ing salient causing them to vote for political parties that represent that identity
as suggested by Brass (2003) and many others. In this case, if we assume that
a certain fraction of the population of both communities votes according to reli-
gion, then the gain for the party representing the majority community would be
higher, thus explaining the increased vote share of the BJP. This effect would be
temporary compared to point 2, which would lead to a more permanent change in
voting behaviour.
To check for the presence of the first mechanism, we look for the effect of the nearest
riot distance variable φ(dit−1) described in section 5.3.1, on election turnout. We find
that the impact on turnout is negative but not statistically significant. Ideally, we would
want to check if the impact is different for Hindus and Muslims, but in the absence
of individual-level data we can only conduct an approximate check using the religious
composition of the district. If the turnout of Muslims reduces more than that of Hindus,
then the districts with a higher proportion of Muslims should mechanically have a larger
reduction in turnout after riots. To check this we conduct a series of regressions over
a rolling window of 500 observations in increasing order of the proportion of Muslims
in the population. The results are shown in Figure 1 below. The middle line indicates
the point estimate for the coefficient while the other two lines indicate the confidence
interval of two times the standard error. We can see that the turnout remains unaffected
in districts with more than 5% Muslim population. In districts with very few Muslims,
the turnout may be decreasing because of security threats to a very small minority or
because religious polarisation makes the election uncompetitive when one of the reli-
gions is very small in numbers. In any case, it is very unlikely that turnout reduction is
the reason for increased BJP vote share as a result of riots.
24
-.3
-.2
-.1
0
.1
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t e
st
im
at
e
0 5 10 15 20
Percentage Muslim population
Figure 1. Change in the effect of riots on turnout with respect to percentage of Muslims
To check if riots lead to a permanent change in voting behaviour, we look at the
effect of riots at higher lags. We find that the instrument is weak at higher lags as Hindu
festivals falling on Fridays do not lead to as much of an increase in riots as they do in the
year just preceding the election.6 Hence we show the reduced form and the structural
estimates at 1, 2 and 3 year lags in Figure 2. We stop at 3 years because the average
gap between elections is 4.4 years. As we can see, both the structural and reduced
form estimates are not significantly different from zero at higher lags, indicating that
riots change voting behaviour only for the election happening in the year after and not
beyond that. This suggests that a possible ’learning’ mechanism may not be driving our
results.
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6If we take this as evidence that political parties or their supporters are using the festival coincidence
to instigate riots in the year before elections, then this would suggest that the electoral effect of riots does
decay with time, which is why they are being orchestrated in the year before elections.
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Figure 2. Coefficients on different lags
By excluding the other two possibilities, polarisation seems to be the most likely
explanation. Comparing the average BJP vote share of 24%, and the increase in vote
share of 8 percentage points, with the average population share of Hindus of about 80%,
it is obvious that a very small section of the Hindu population changes their voting
behaviour as a result of experiencing a riot. In Figure 3, we plot the change in the
coefficient on φ(dit−1) with variation in the Muslim population share. The coefficient
is reasonably stable, with a small dip for districts with population share of Muslims
greater than about 13%. This shows that the proportion of the population becoming
polarised and changing their voting behaviour is not dependent on the population share
of Muslims.
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Figure 3. Change in the coefficient with respect to percentage of Muslims
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5.6 Robustness checks
5.6.1 Fractional response
All the regressions shown above are linear, whereas the dependent variable BJP voteshareit
is a fraction and is thus bounded. To estimate the main regression while allowing for the
fractional dependent variable, we use the method suggested by Papke and Wooldridge
(2008). The explanatory variable is φ(dit−1), which we name Riot ′it−1. This method
involves controlling for district level fixed effects by explicitly controlling for the time-
means of the dependent variables. The resulting regression is essentially a random ef-
fects regression which allows for specifying the estimating equation as a logit or a probit
function. The endogeneity correction using the instrumental variable is achieved using
the control function approach. The residuals from the first stage regression, also called
the control function, are used as additional regressors in the main regression. Papke and
Wooldridge suggest two methods for conducting fractional dependent variable regres-
sions controlling for fixed effects and allowing for endogeneity and we conduct both
types of regressions. The first is a Bernoulli quasi maximum likelihood estimation and
the second is a pooled panel generalised estimating equation approach. In both cases
we assume the link function to be probit. We present the results and the estimated av-
erage marginal effects in Table 7. Note that we do not use demographic and public
goods controls as then the relevant coefficient loses significance in the first stage. Also,
we include five year fixed effects as time fixed effects are recommended in the Papke-
Wooldridge procedure - dropping this does not change the results. The marginal effects
obtained are very similar to the linear estimates and hence demonstrate that a linear
approximation may not be incorrect in this case.
Table 7. Regressions using the Papke-Wooldridge method
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5.6.2 Alternative explanatory variable
Our main explanatory variable is an indicator of at least one riot having taken place
in the district in the calendar year before the year in which the election occurred. But
elections can take place in different months in a year. So, now we construct the ex-
planatory variable using riots occurring in a 12-month period preceding the election.
The results using this variable are shown below and they are very similar to our original
regressions.
Table 8. Regressions using riots in a 12-month period before the election as an explanatory
variable
5.6.3 Time fixed effects and time trends
We have not used time fixed effects in our regressions. Here we first show that if we use
year fixed effects then we lose power in our regressions. We divide the total period of 22
years in which the BJP contested elections (1980-2001) into four periods of 5-6 years
viz, 1981-1986, 1987-1991, 1992-1996, 1997-2001 and we use these dummies as ’five-
year fixed effects’. The logic is that within each one of these four periods, we would
have elections in all states, thus capturing any country-wide fixed effects. We can see in
the results below that using time fixed effects leads to the IV regression losing power.
This is because of the nature of the instrument where most of the variation comes from
temporal variation as it is highly correlated in the cross-sectional dimension. We also
use region specific time trends, dividing the states into five regions.7We can see that the
results are robust to using region specific linear trends.
7North- Punjab, Haryana and Jammu & Kashmir, Central- Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh
and Bihar, East- West Bengal, Assam and Orissa, West- Gujarat and Maharashtra, South- Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Kerala.
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Table 9. Regressions with time fixed effects and region specific time trends
Time fixed effects are intended to account for unobservable time shocks that affects
both the dependent variable and the explanatory variable or the instrument. In our case,
the instrument is completely exogenous and so the purpose of time fixed effects would
be to check for the possibility that by chance in a few of the election years in which
BJP did well, a Hindu festival happened to fall on a Friday in the preceding year and
this is driving our result. While we do indirectly check this by dropping some years and
states in the next subsection, we cannot directly check for this possibility using time
fixed effects because of the lack of cross-sectional variation in the instrument.
We can introduce cross-sectional variation in the instrument by changing our spec-
ification slightly. So far we have been looking at the extensive margin of riots to avoid
making any assumptions about the nature of the cumulative effect of multiple riots. We
now assume a linear cumulative effect, which implies that we can add all the (distance
weighted) riots and check for their total effect on elections. The specification would
now be
BJP vote shareit =α+βb ∑
j=1 to n(t)
φ(di jt−1)+γ1BJP governmentit−1+γ2Demographic controlsit+
γ3Public goods provisionit +ηt +δi+ εit
Here, j indicates an individual riot and n(t) indicates the total number of riots in
year t. φ(.) is the same Gaussian weighting function that we have used earlier. di jt−1
indicates the distance between district i and riot j in year t-1. We have replaced the
quadratic time trend with individual year fixed effects ηt . We call this explanatory vari-
able All riots. We construct a similar expression for the instrument variable for All riots,
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given by ∑
k=1 to 338
φ(dik)Festivalkt−1. Here, k is a district and dik denotes the distance
between districts i and k. Using this instrument implies that a district that is closer to
a lot of other districts that are experiencing the coincidence of a Hindu festival falling
on a Friday, is likely to have more riots happening near it. This specification allows
us to exploit the variation in distances between districts that have the coincidence and
those that do not, to generate the cross-sectional variation necessary for using year fixed
effects. The results for the regression are given below. The coefficient is positive and
significant but has a different interpretation to coefficients of earlier regressions. This
coefficient implies that every riot that happens in a district in the year before elections
increases the BJP’s vote share by 2.8 percentage points. This exercise allows us to reject
the possibility that our results are driven by chance.
Table 10. Regressions using the cumulative of all riots in the preceding year
5.6.4 Dropping states and years
During the period covered in our study, two of the states that we include - Punjab and
Jammu & Kashmir - underwent a spate of violence between separatist organisations and
the state. These separatist movements had communal undertones and would have af-
fected riots as well as electoral politics. These two states are also different from the rest
of our sample as they are not Hindu majority states - Punjab has a majority population
of Sikhs and Jammu & Kashmir has a majority population of Muslims. Hence we drop
these two states and conduct the main regressions on a sample of 14 Hindu majority
states. The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 11. We find that the
coefficients in the first two specifications are unchanged but that in the last two they are
considerably larger than in the full sample.
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The demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya in 1992 was a major event in the
history of independent India and the riots occurring in its aftermath in 1992 and in
1993 were widespread, and were covered widely in the national media and in academic
writing soon after (Gopal 1993). To check that our results are not being driven mainly
by this one major event, we drop the years 1993 and 1994 and run the regressions. The
results are presented in columns 3 and 4. We find that the coefficients are still positive
but they lose some significance in the IV specifications. This may be because in non-
Hindu majority states, the riots may be having different effects compared to Hindu
majority states. To check this we run the regressions without Jammu and Kashmir, and
Punjab (columns 5 and 6), and find that the coefficients are similar in magnitude and
significance to earlier regressions.
Table 11. Regressions without observations from Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab
5.6.5 Alternative instrument
In constructing the instrument Festival, we exploited the inter-state differences in the
importance of festivals to generate the variation required to obtain a strong instrument.
To investigate if our results are robust to changes in the methodology used for construct-
ing the instrument, we construct two alternative instruments. Festival 1 disregards the
interstate differences. We select five of the most important Hindu festivals - Dushehra,
Diwali, Ramanavami, Janmashtami and Shivaratri and set the instrument as 1 (and 0
otherwise) for all states whenever one of these festivals falls on a Friday. Festival 2 in-
cludes only the festivals that vary across states and excludes the two all-India festivals
- Dushehra and Diwali. The results are shown in Table 12, and they are very similar to
the earlier results.
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Table 12. Regressions using Festival 1 and Festival 2 as instruments
5.6.6 Results for the Indian National Congress
In all our regressions we have only examined until now the effect of riots on the vote
share of the BJP. We can also investigate their effect on the other major national party,
the Indian National Congress. Since these two parties compete against each other in
most elections, we expect to see a negative effect on the vote share of the Congress
and that is what we observe as shown in Table 13 below. This is consistent with other
studies from political science which have also suggested that the Congress’s vote share
in state assemby elections was affected adversely by the outbreak of an additional riot
(Nellis, Weaver and Rosenzweig, 2015).
Table 13. Regressions for the Indian National Congress
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5.6.7 Lagged dependent variable
Another issue that may be important is the effect of the vote share of the BJP in the last
election. This may affect both riots and the vote share in the next election. We argue
that the effect of the previous election on riots would work through the government
and we do control for having a BJP government in the state. We also find that even if
we explicitly control for the BJP’s vote share in the last election, the coefficient is not
statistically significant, as shown in Table 14.
Table 14. Regressions with lagged vote share
All the robustness checks above confirm that the results observed in the main re-
gressions are robust to different samples and specifications. We conclude therefore that
our results do represent the causal effect of religious riots on the vote share of the BJP
in India.
6 Conclusion
Religious riots have complex underpinnings - frequently social, economic and political
factors are involved. This paper demonstrates how these riots may influence voter be-
haviour and the incentives of political parties. Using data on Hindu-Muslims riots in
India over 25 years, combined with electoral and demographic data, we demonstrate a
causal link between electoral politics and communal riots. We use an innovative instru-
ment that draws upon the random variation in the day of the week that important Hindu
festivals fall on each year to isolate the causal effect of riots on electoral results. We
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find that riots occurring in the year preceding an election increase the vote share of the
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in the election. Our results are robust to vari-
ous robustness checks on the data and econometric analysis. This result does not imply
that riots are not caused by electoral reasons. It may be the case that most of the riots
are in fact the result of political calculations. Our attempt here is to disassociate those
political reasons for riots and to examine the effect on electoral results of exogenously
caused riots. The fact that our results show that a party systematically benefits from the
riots, may establish that there is a clear incentive for this party to cause riots for elec-
toral benefit. Therefore, our findings have important implications for the relationship
between ethnic violence and electoral politics not just in India, but also in other diverse
democratic societies.
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Appendix 1
List of Hindu festivals by state used in the instrument Festival
Appendix 2
Let,
y be the dependent variable, the BJP vote share
x be the explanatory binary variable, Riot
z be the instrument variable, Festival
Now, let x be the result of under-reporting of the actual incidences of riots x*, with
only a fraction p of the actual riots getting reported.
Therefore, E[x|x∗ = 1] = p, 0 < p < 1, and E[x|x∗ = 0] = 0
Also, let the overall probability of riots happening E[x∗] = λ , 0 < λ < 1.
This implies that if a riot is reported, then the probability of an actual riot is 1, i.e.
E[x∗ = 1|x = 1] = 1 (1)
But if no riot is reported, then the probability of an actual riot is
E[x∗ = 1|x = 0] = E[x∗ = 1,x = 0]/E[x = 0] = λ (1− p)
1− pλ (2)
Also, let us assume that the reporting or non-reporting of the riots is independent of
our dependent variable.
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∴ E[y|x,x∗] = E[y|x∗] (3)
Now, we want to look at how this biases our estimates.
The OLS estimate using only the reported riots would be,
βˆOLS = E[y|x = 1]−E[y|x = 0]
= E[y|x = 1,x∗ = 1]E[x∗ = 1|x = 1]+E[y|x = 1,x∗ = 0]E[x∗ = 0|x = 1]
−E[y|x = 0,x∗ = 1]E[x∗ = 1|x = 0]−E[y|x = 0,x∗ = 0]E[x∗ = 0|x = 0]
Rearranging and using (3)
βˆOLS = E[y|x∗ = 1](E[x∗ = 1|x = 1]−E[x∗ = 1|x = 0])
−E[y|x∗ = 0](E[x∗ = 0|x = 0]−E[x∗ = 0|x = 1])
Using (1) and (2)
βˆOLS = E[y|x∗ = 1](1− λ (1− p)1− pλ )
−E[y|x∗ = 0]( 1−λ
1− pλ −0)
=
1−λ
1− pλ (E[y|x
∗ = 1]−E[y|x∗ = 0])
=
1−λ
1− pλ βˆ
∗
OLS
Since,
1−λ
1− pλ < 1, the OLS estimate will be biased towards zero.
Now, let us look at the IV estimate. Again, the main assumption is that reporting is
independent of Festival.
∴ E[x = 1|z] = pE[x∗ = 1|z] (4)
The IV estimate calculated using the reported riots x is given by
βˆIV =
E[y|z = 1]−E[y|z = 0]
E[x|z = 1]−E[x|z = 0] =
1
p
E[y|z = 1]−E[y|z = 0]
E[x∗|z = 1]−E[x∗|z = 0] =
1
p
βˆ ∗IV
Since 0 < p < 1, the magnitude of the IV estimate will be biased upwards. we have
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shown the proofs here using simple regressions but the principles apply to regressions
with other covariates.
Now let us look at the probable magnitudes of the bias in our case. Let us assume
that the actual probability of a riot happening in a district in a given year is λ = 0.1, and
the rate of reporting is p= 0.7. This gives us the observed probability of riots as we see
in the data of pλ = 0.07.
The OLS is biased by 1-
1−λ
1− pλ = 1−
0.9
0.93
' 3%
The IV is biased by 1/p−1 = 1/0.7−1' 43%
Hence, the bias in the IV estimate is very large, and this may explain the estimates
that we obtain. This is because the effect of the reporting rate p on the OLS estimate
is moderated by the overall probability λ , whereas the IV estimate is directly impacted
by p. The lower the reporting rate the higher the bias in both cases, but the magnitude
of the bias in bounded above by λ in the OLS case, whereas in the case of IV, it is
unbounded.
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